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I. INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIC WOES AMONGST THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF NORTH 
AMERICA 
“I think the American people are disposed often to be generous rather than just.” 
—Fredrick Douglas1 
 
For the year 2013, the Bureau of Indian Affairs—an agency tasked with “pro-
mot[ing] economic opportunity,” managing trust assets, and “enhanc[ing] the quality of 
life” amongst American Indians—requested $2.6 billion.2 This money provides assistance 
to Native American Indian tribes for aspects of reservation life ranging from supporting 
tribal universities to promoting efficiency amongst tribal governments.3 In addition to 
these programs, tribe members living on reservations also receive federal assistance for 
education, healthcare, and housing.4 
Yet in spite of extensive government assistance programs, the conditions on Indian 
reservations border on squalor, with one New York Times columnist describing them as 
“Poverty’s Poster Child.”5 For example, on the Pine Ridge reservation—one of the poorest 
places in America—the unemployment rate exceeds eighty percent.6 In Shannon County, 
part of the Pine Ridge reservation, the per capita income averages less than $9,000 per 
year, and over half of the population lives in poverty.7 The effects of these disastrous eco-
nomic conditions help drive the high rates of suicide, infant mortality, deaths due to dia-
betes and heart disease, and substance abuse commonplace on Indian reservations.8 
The familiar narratives invoked to explain these conditions usually focus on the con-
tinuing effect of the historical injustices perpetrated against American Indians.9 While the 
                                                                            
 1. Fredrick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-
Slavery Society at Boston (1865), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/what-the-
black-man-wants/. 
 2. INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU HIGHLIGHTS 79 (2013), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/2013/highlights/upload/BH079.pdf [hereinafter INDIAN AFFAIRS]; 
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND PERFORMANCE 
INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2013 IA-OVW-1 (2013), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/ docu-
ments/text/idc016442.pdf. 
 3. INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 2, at 79-80.  
 4. See BUREAU OF INDIAN EDUCATION (last updated Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.bie.edu/; INDIAN HEALTH 
SERVICE, http://www.ihs.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); Office of Native American Programs, Indian Housing, 
DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudpor-
tal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/ih (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 5. Nicholas D. Kristof, Poverty’s Poster Child, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012), http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/05/10/opinion/kristof-povertys-poster-child.html?_r=0; Annie Lowrey, Pain on the Reserva-
tion, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/business/economy/us-budget-cuts-fall-
heavily-on-american-indians.html. 
 6. Lowrey, supra note 5. 
 7. Id.; United States Census Bureau, Shannon County QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau, 
CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/46/46113.html; SHANNON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA, 
http://shannon.sdcounties.org/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).  
 8. Office of Minority Health, American Indian/Alaska Native Profile, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS. (last modified Sept. 17, 2012), http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/templates/ browse.aspx?lvl=2&lvlID=52.  
 9. Aaron Huey, TEDxDU: America’s Native Prisoners of War (uploaded 2010), available at 
http://www.ted.com/talks/aaron_huey.html. Commentators frequently blame the economic plight of modern 
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detrimental effects of the federal government’s policies are undeniable, a new narrative is 
emerging in the quest to discover the headwaters which feed the river of tribal poverty and 
despair.10 Economists and tribal leaders now recognize a new causal factor: a lack of work-
able private property rights, which increases transactional costs and stifles reservation 
economies.11 
The problem of poverty on reservations extends beyond the borders of the United 
States and afflicts the indigenous populations of Canada, known as the First Nations.12 
Fifty percent of status First Nations children live below the poverty line.13 Unemployment 
rates on reservations average ten percent higher than for members of the same racial groups 
who live off the reservations.14 Poverty amongst First Nations currently costs Canadians 
$4 billion a year.15 
But there are new voices in Canada today that demand change and offer First Nations 
hope of escape from poverty.16 One such voice, Manny Jules—former band chief of the 
Kamloops and chairman of the Indian Nations Tax Commission—spearheaded the latest 
push for increased property rights and tribal sovereignty through the First Nations Property 
Ownership Initiative (“FNPO”).17 If the FNPO passes, First Nations could exercise in-
creased sovereignty over their land and reduce transactional costs by ending their trust 
relationship with the Crown, and First Nations could grant fee simple title to band mem-
bers with reversionary title held by the band.18 The FNPO would increase prosperity on 
reservations through reducing transactional costs and enhancing access to capital in a cul-
turally appropriate manner, and Congress should implement a similar system for commu-
nally held lands on reservations in the United States. 
This article begins with Part II tracing the philosophical origins of governmental 
policies that dealt with indigenous peoples in North America.19 Part III tracks the progress 
                                                                            
American Indians on the forcible removal of their ancestors from their traditional homelands and the subsequent 
attempts at assimilation. Id. 
 10. John Koppisch, Why Are Indian Reservations So Poor? A Look at the Bottom 1%, FORBES.COM (Dec. 13, 
2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoppisch/2011/12/13/why-are-indian-reservations-so-poor-a-look-at-
the-bottom-1/; see HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST 
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).  
 11. See Koppisch, supra note 10; Kristof, supra note 5 (“A second [factor] is that reservations are often 
structured in ways that discourage private investment.”); TOM FLANAGAN ET AL., BEYOND THE INDIAN ACT: 
RESTORING ABORIGINAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2010).  
 12. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 136; Muslims Gather Food for First Nations, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, 
Nov. 26, 2013, at D12. 
 13. DAVID MACDONALD & DANIEL WILSON, CAN. CTR. FOR POLICY ALTS., POVERTY OR PROSPERITY: 
INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN CANADA 6 (2013), available at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/de-
fault/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2013/06/Poverty_or_Prosperity_Indigenous_Children.pdf.  
 14. CAN. STATISTICS, TBL. 7 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR THE FIRST NATIONS IDENTITY 
POPULATION AND THE REGISTERED INDIAN POPULATION (AGED 25 TO 54) LIVING ON AND OFF RESERVE, 
CANADA, 2001 AND 2006 (2009), available at https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-
559/table/t7-eng.cfm.  
 15. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 136. 
 16. See generally FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11.  
 17. Biography—Mr. C.T. (Manny) Jules, ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEV. CAN., 
http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100015525/1100100015526 (last modified Sept. 15, 2010); First Na-
tions Tax Comm’n, FIRST NATIONS PROPERTY OWNERSHIP INITIATIVE, http://fnpo.ca/Home.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2013). 
 18. First Nations Tax Comm’n, Proposal, FIRST NATIONS PROPERTY OWNERSHIP INITIATIVE, 
http://fnpo.ca/Proposal.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 19. See infra Part II. 
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of modern aboriginal property rights in Canada, and Part IV explores the history of tribal 
property rights in the United States.20 Part V introduces the proposed next step to increase 
economic health and sovereignty amongst First Nations: the First Nations Property Own-
ership Initiative.21 Part VI addresses how the United States’ adoption of a policy similar 
to the FNPO would affect American Indians living on reservations.22 
II. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE INTERACTION WITH ABORIGINAL 
POPULATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA 
A.  The Whig and Tory Traditions 
In order to properly understand the present day regulatory structure afflicting the 
indigenous peoples of North America, one must understand the philosophical basis of that 
system.23 The cultural divide which defined the original English settlers—the conflict be-
tween the Whig and Tory political traditions—also defines the modern system of regula-
tion affecting the indigenous peoples of North America.24 The Whig tradition emphasized 
“individualism, Protestantism, representative government, and free trade.”25 Followers of 
the Whig tradition believed themselves to be the recipients of a folkright which traced its 
genealogy to the social and political structure of Anglo-Saxon England before the Norman 
invasion in 1066.26 This folkright entitled them to personal autonomy, representative gov-
ernment as symbolized by the parliamentary system, and a law which was not merely “a 
projection of the wishes of the ruler,” but which “bound the King just as surely as it bound 
his meanest subject.”27 
In contrast, the Tory tradition sought to achieve societal stability through support for 
strong, centralized leadership.28 Tracing its roots back to the Cavaliers who fought for the 
monarchy during the English Civil War, Toryism adhered to the principles of “monarchy, 
aristocracy, episcopacy, hierarchy, loyalty, and land.”29 Tory social and economic policies 
demonstrated a strong focus on “[m]aintaining law and order and the institution of the 
British Crown.”30 This included supporting “conservative and anti-revolutionary” values, 
while still expressing “opposition to laissez-faire economics.”31 
Though the English colonies in North America contained a significant population of 
                                                                            
 20. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 21. See infra Part V. 
 22. See infra Part VI. 
 23. DANIEL HANNAN, INVENTING FREEDOM: HOW THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES MADE THE MODERN 
WORLD (2013). 
 24. Id. at 15–16.  
 25. Id. at 168–69. 
 26. Id. at 15. 
 27. Id. at 63. 
 28. Id. at 212. During both the English Civil War (which Hannan describes as the First Anglosphere Civil 
War) and the American Revolutionary War (described as the Second Anglosphere Civil War) Tory sympathy 
rested with the Crown. In contrast, Whig sympathy rested with parliament during the First Anglosphere Civil 
War and with truly representative, local parliamentary government during the Second Anglosphere Civil War. 
See id. at 168–69, 223, 225. 
 29. Id. at 168–69, 225.  
 30. PHILIP MASSOLIN, CANADIAN INTELLECTUALS, THE TORY TRADITION, AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
MODERNITY, 1939–1970 8 (2001). 
 31. Id.  
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those who held to the essentially pseudo-libertarian Whig tradition in domestic affairs, 
colonists’ dealings with indigenous peoples fell deeply within the Tory tradition of cen-
tralized, unilateral control.32 The revolutionary principles that constituted the first green 
buds of a sustained libertarian tradition in domestic dealings did not extend to foreign 
affairs, defense, and trade.33 Additionally, in the mind of both philosophers and settlers, 
indigenous peoples who were different in culture, language, and blood lay far “beyond the 
circle of reciprocity” within which they recognized obligations.34 
Today, tribes are openly challenging the ruling Tory paradigm in which the power 
to govern flows not from individual to individual through contract nor from the people to 
the government, but emanates from the sovereign who then makes decisions on behalf of 
the people.35 Native American and First Nations entrepreneurs and tribal leaders are re-
jecting a strong central authority—even a seemingly benevolent one—in favor of the es-
sentially Whig principles of personal autonomy, representative government through 
widely dispersed power, and personal property rights.36 Still, the vast majority of the dia-
logue regarding issues affecting tribes rests on the idea of a centrally planned economy: 
explicitly disparaging instances of incompetence or avarice, while implicitly attesting to 
the virtue of the plan itself.37 
B. The Historical Effect of Toryism on Interactions with Native Peoples 
On October 7, 1763, King George III issued a document that crystallized the British 
policy of centralized control of interactions with the indigenous populations in North 
America: the Royal Proclamation of 1763.38 Released following the Treaty of Paris in 
                                                                            
 32. HANNAN, supra note 23, at 211–12; FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 57–58; In addressing paradoxical 
behaviors (such as maintaining a foreign and domestic policy which are diametrically opposed on principle), 
Malcolm Gladwell argues that people do not attempt to reconcile them as much as they use the instances of 
virtuous behavior to legitimize instances of morally wrong behavior. Malcolm Gladwell, Talk at The New Yorker 
Festival: Tokens, Pariahs, and Pioneers (Oct. 6, 2013), available at http://www.newyorker.com/video?video-
id=2724681165001.  
 33. HANNAN, supra note 23, at 214 (“Even the most radical Patriots accepted . . . that the wider British im-
perium of which they formed a part should be in charge of foreign policy and defense, and most also accepted 
that such sovereignty implied control over external trade . . . .”). 
 34. Id. at 282–83.  
 35. Scugog Island First Nation Land Management Code, s. 4.1 (1997), available at http://labrc.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2014/03/Mississaugas-of-Scugog-Island-Land-Code.pdf (“The power of Scugog Island First Nation 
to govern and administer our lands flows from the Creator to the people of Scugog Island First Nation, and from 
the people to their Council.”).  
 36. MANNY JULES, Foreward to TOM FLANAGAN ET AL., BEYOND THE INDIAN ACT: RESTORING 
ABORIGINAL PROPERTY RIGHTS x (2010).  
We became the poorest of the poor because after contact the governments of Canada and 
the United States passed legislation that removed us from the economy . . . The path I 
chose was to legislate our way back into the economy and build institutions that implement 
our collective rights and release our individual creative energy. 
Id.; CanupawakpaDakota, Children of the Plains, YOUTUBE (uploaded 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GACcBe9Be58 (“Business ownership is new for us. We’ve had the govern-
ment hand us food, hand us this, hand us the necessities . . . [we are] a society that was made dependent.”). 
 37. Lowrey, supra note 5 (“More people sick; fewer people educated; fewer people getting general assistance; 
more domestic violence; more alcoholism,” said Richard L. Zephier, the executive director of the Oglala Sioux 
tribe. “That’s all correlated to the cuts from sequestration.”); ThomasPaine4, John Stossel-03/25/11-C, YOUTUBE 
(uploaded 2011) (“I think the government should be giving the Indian people more appropriations so that we can 
exist out here.”), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=icS5eLWYv0w; see generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE 
ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).  
 38. ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763, available at http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/proc63.htm. 
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1763, the Royal Proclamation enunciated the official position of the British government 
with regard to indigenous populations living in North America and the land they held.39 
The Royal Proclamation reserved all lands not already controlled by the governments es-
tablished by the Crown or granted to the Hudson’s Bay Company for use by the Indians.40 
The Crown declared that these reserved lands would remain under its “Sovereignty, Pro-
tection, and Dominion.”41 In addition to reserving those lands for future use by the Indians, 
the Royal Proclamation also required that all British citizens who had settled there remove 
themselves.42 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 did not stop at recognizing the rights of the Indians 
to use the land newly governed by the Crown and ordering settlers to vacate non-British 
held lands; it “strictly forbid, on Pain of our Displeasure,” the private purchase of Indian 
land by settlers.43 Citing the need to stop “great Frauds and Abuses” perpetrated by settlers 
seeking to purchase Indian land, the Royal Proclamation announced that the Crown would 
hold a monopoly on the future purchase of any Indian land.44 The Crown declared this 
circumscription of the rights of the individual necessary in order to prevent fraud, remove 
ill will amongst the Indians which might lead to violence, “and to the end that the Indians 
may be convinced of our Justice.”45 
Prior to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the British and colonial governments ne-
gotiated and entered into treaties with tribes of sovereign nations.46 Yet the Crown’s posi-
tion in drafting the Royal Proclamation went beyond simply enforcing fairness when en-
tering into land dealings with the sovereign Indian tribes for the parties’ mutual benefit.47 
It assumed control of the right to acquire or alienate land under the cloak of protectionism 
and benevolence.48 While the short-term motivation for the regulation or interdiction of 
commercial intercourse between the settlers and Indian bands was ostensibly a reaction to 
instances of violence provoked by fraud, the practical implications of the proclamation 
was the establishment of a faulty monopoly.49 
The “old and recurrent fantasy,”50 that before contact with Europeans native popu-
lations were absolute strangers to the tripartite Whig principle of personal autonomy, rep-
resentative government, and especially private property rights, gave birth to the core prin-
ciples which underlie the Royal Proclamation and its progeny legislation.51 These 
                                                                            
 39. John F. Leslie, The Indian Act: An Historical Perspective, 25 CAN. PARLIAMENTARY REV. 23 (2002), 
available at http://www.revparl.ca/english/archives.asp. 
 40. ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763, ¶ 14. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. ¶ 16. 
 43. Id. ¶ 15. 
 44. Id. ¶ 17 (A representative of the Crown could purchase land from the Indians “only for Us [the Crown], 
in our Name.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Janique Dubois & Kelly Saunders, “Just Do It!”: Carving Out a Space for the 
Métis in Canadian Federalism, 46 CAN. J. OF POLITICAL SCI. 188–89 (2013). 
 47. Id. at 188. 
 48. Leslie, supra note 39, at 23.  
 49. ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763, ¶ 17; FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 57–59. 
 50. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 30. 
 51. Id. at 30–31; see also Craig S. Galbraith et al., False Myths and Indigenous Entrepreneurial Strategies, 
19 J. OF SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1 (2006). 
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presumptions rationalized the conclusion that only a strong, benevolent central power me-
diating interactions between the tribes and the colonists could achieve justice and under-
standing between the parties and justified the “expropriation [of land] with little or no 
compensation.”52 However, today, as the understanding of First Nations and Native Amer-
ican history increases, voices for political and economic reform assert that indigenous pop-
ulations utilized open, market-based economies, with different forms of private property 
rights pre-colonization.53 
While the indigenous populations did not have a single set of standardized property 
rights pre-contact, tribes across North America maximized the usefulness of their available 
resources through the customized property rights they practiced and the market-based 
economies they maintained.54 The First Nations of Canada engaged in extensive trade be-
tween different bands and created roads, currencies, written records of transactions, and 
settled on a common trade language.55 Tribes living on the west coast asserted ownership 
over certain streams in which salmon would spawn, and they practiced husbandry of those 
streams.56 In areas where trapping was an important economic activity, families asserted 
ownership rights to prime locations.57 In pre-colonial California, Native American farming 
tribes allowed tribe members to own property privately under a homesteading system.58 
Once a tribe member gained ownership of the land, the tribe member could “protect[] [the 
land] against trespassers and squatters; it could also be sold, leased, and inherited.”59 
Even though the differences in the conditions in which private property rights 
emerged created differences in the property rights practiced by indigenous peoples and 
European settlers, First Nations and Native American tribes certainly had a conception of 
private property which would likely have allowed an evolution in land transactions to pro-
gress towards a satisfactory end.60 Instead, the establishment of the Crown’s monopoly 
took one of the most divisive issues of the eighteenth and nineteenth century—the aliena-
tion and acquisition of land in North America—out of the hands of those who would have 
had the greatest incentive to achieve an outcome with a peaceful and satisfactory end: the 
“private Person.”61 Instead, a remote power—the Crown and its representatives—took di-
rect control of the outcome, though distance largely insulated the Crown from the direct 
effect of the policies it enacted.62 This policy of order through edicts and centralization 
                                                                            
 52. ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763, ¶ 17; FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 31. 
 53. JULES, supra note 36, at xii. 
Throughout our history we have had the ability to choose successful innovations and reject 
poor ones. Our most successful innovators were the Maya, Aztecs, and Incas, but each of 
our cultures built on our competitive advantage and created sustainable economies. After 
contact, a system of central planning was imposed on us. 
Id.; see also TERRY ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATIONS?: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS (1995).  
 54. Galbraith et al., supra note 51, at 4. 
 55. JULES, supra note 36, at ix. 
 56. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 34–36; Galbraith et al., supra note 51, at 4. 
 57. Galbraith et al., supra note 51, at 4–5.  
 58. Id. at 4. 
 59. Id.  
 60. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 30–41. 
 61. ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763, ¶ 17. 
 62. Id. 
7
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had a devastating effect on the economic plight of the indigenous peoples of North Amer-
ica through its philosophical progeny: the Indian Act in Canada and the Dawes Act in the 
United States.63 
III. THE HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AMONGST THE  
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF CANADA 
A. The Indian Act: Early Incarnations of Property Rights 
Passed in 1876, the Indian Act governed the modern relationship between the Cana-
dian government and the First Nations bands in Canada.64 The same attitude of protection-
ism and patronization that infected earlier interactions with First Nations became a corner-
stone of the Indian Act.65 The Indian Act regulated nearly every aspect of the lives of the 
members of First Nations, from who the Canadian Government considered an Indian to 
the maintenance of roads and bridges on reservations to how the tribes could conduct 
trade.66 The Indian Act also gave the Indian Affairs department great power to insert its 
discretion into the day-to-day activities of First Nations bands.67 For instance, under the 
Indian Act a member of certain First Nations bands could not so much as give a potato to 
someone who was not a member of his or her band without the written permission of the 
superintendent.68 
The Indian Act of 1876 also established the property rights of members of First Na-
tions bands.69 The question of First Nations property rights in general is intimately linked 
with both the text of the Indian Act and its inception against a backdrop of discontent and 
threatened violence related to land allotments and compensation.70 On the cusp of deciding 
the scope of First Nations property rights, the government of Canada decided the real ques-
tion that would determine the government’s dealing with the First Nations for generations 
to come: whether the government would treat Indians ‘as minors or as white men.’71 In 
1873, a memorandum from the Deputy Superintendent-General confirmed the govern-
ment’s position that “the legal status of the Indians of Canada is that of minors, with the 
Government as their guardians.”72 
Under the Indian Act of 1876, the government provided for the first in a series of 
incarnations of quasi-property rights—the location ticket.73 A location ticket entitled its 
                                                                            
 63. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I–5 (last amended Apr. 1, 2013); An Act to Provide for the Allotment of 
Lands in Severalty to Indians on the Various Reservations (General Allotment Act or Dawes Act), 24 Stat. 388 
(1887), available at http://public.csusm.edu/nadp/a1887.htm [hereinafter Dawes Act]. 
 64. KEN COATES, THE INDIAN ACT AND THE FUTURE OF ABORIGINAL GOVERNANCE IN CANADA 1 (2008). 
 65. Id. at 2 (“Its basic premises, summarized as providing for ‘civilization, protection and assimilation,’ were 
that the Government of Canada viewed Aboriginal people as wards, that Indigenous communities and govern-
ments were incapable of managing their affairs . . . .”). 
 66. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I–5, s. 5–6, 34, 91–92. 
 67. COATES, supra note 64, at 2. 
 68. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1–5, s. 32(1).  
 69. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 66.  
 70. KAHN-TINETA MILLER ET AL., THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN ACT 58 (1978).  
 71. Id. at 60. 
 72. Id. (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original). 
 73. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 66; MILLER ET AL., supra note 70, at 62. 
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possessor to a sort of enhanced life estate on a plot of land located within the band’s allot-
ted reserve land.74 Even after a tribe member received a location ticket, the tribe member 
could not freely alienate his land since the Indian Act did not permit legal seizure of the 
land, transfer of the land to someone outside the band, or transfer of the land to someone 
within the band without the band’s approval.75 The only way for a member of a recognized 
First Nations band to gain true fee simple title to the land was through enfranchisement.76 
Enfranchisement refers to the process by which an Indian who the Crown “judged to be of 
good moral character, free of debt, and could read and write English” could voluntarily 
revoke his status as an Indian under the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857.77 
This policy, which prohibited the alienation of First Nations land and vested ultimate 
title not in the band but in the Crown, had disastrous economic consequences for First 
Nations tribes partly because it prevented them from leveraging their land in order to ob-
tain capital.78 Manny Jules, former chief of the Kamloops, describes the policy as creating 
“a 100-year credit crisis from which [First Nations] have yet to recover.”79 Because of this 
credit crisis, First Nations entrepreneurs could not draw upon the value of the 6.5 million 
acres of land in Canadian reserves, which crippled their attempts to open businesses.80 
Reservations desperately needed these businesses to create an upwardly mobile society; 
yet, as Manny Jules explained, “A lot of small businesses never get started because people 
can’t leverage property [to raise funds]”.81 
Location tickets or fee simple title gained through enfranchisement were the only 
property ownership options available to most First Nations bands for the next seventy-five 
years.82 In 1951, an amendment to the Indian Act introduced the next step toward true 
property rights for First Nations bands—the certificate of possession.83 Certificates of pos-
session were an improvement over location tickets because they provided stronger statu-
tory property rights as well as more secure tenure.84 Yet these certificates of possession 
fell dramatically short of full property rights as they were transferrable only within the 
band and creditors could not legally seize the land, which made it more difficult to borrow 
against its value.85 In addition, transactions required approval from the minister of Indian 
Affairs.86 Though the intention of the amendment was to introduce the certificate of pos-
session as a stopgap measure between the location ticket and the time the Canadian gov-
                                                                            
 74. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 67. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 63–64, 67.   
 77. Id. at 63–64. 
 78. Id. at 4 (“Lack of collateral is indeed a well-known and serious obstacle to aboriginal business ven-
tures . . . .”). 
 79. JULES, supra note 36, at x. 
 80. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 3. 
 81. Koppisch, supra note 10 (“When you don’t have individual property rights, you can’t build, you can’t be 
bonded, you can’t pass on wealth. A lot of small businesses never get started because people can’t leverage 
property [to raise funds].”).  
 82. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 67. 
 83. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, s. 20(2)–(3); FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 68. 
 84. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 68. 
 85. Id. at 68–69. 
 86. Id. at 68. 
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ernment granted full fee simple title to members of First Nations tribes, the Canadian gov-
ernment never granted fee simple title to all First Nations, and the certificate of possession 
remains in use today.87 
B. White Paper of 1969 
In 1969, the Canadian government released a policy statement proposing a new so-
lution to the continuing difficulties experienced by First Nations.88 This policy paper enti-
tled “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy” was known as the White 
Paper of 1969 (“White Paper”).89 Though the stated intent of the paper was to create poli-
cies that would “lead to the full, free and nondiscriminatory participation of the Indian 
people in Canadian society,”90 the First Nations community intensely criticized the pro-
posals.91 
The White Paper recognized the challenges that members of First Nations faced in 
housing, employment, and education, and it placed the blame for this poor state of affairs 
squarely on the separate legal status the Canadian government imposed on Indians.92 In 
the White Paper, the Canadian government announced its intention to break with the per-
sistent patterns of piecemeal reform and welfare initiatives that the drafters of the paper 
felt would ultimately prove to be insufficient.93 Instead, the Canadian government would 
initiate whole scale legislative reform focused on equalizing the legal status of Indian and 
non-Indian citizens.94 This new policy would create “[t]rue equality,” by ensuring “that 
the Indian people have the right to full and equal participation in the cultural, social, eco-
nomic and political life of Canada.”95 To advance this end, the report laid out six proposi-
tions that would provide guidance to the Canadian government in its future dealings with 
First Nations.96 It also enumerated four concrete steps that the Canadian government was 
prepared to take to implement these policies.97 
                                                                            
 87. Id. at 68–69. 
 88. Univ. B.C., The White Paper 1969, INDIGENOUS FOUNDATIONS (2009), http://indigenousfounda-
tions.arts.ubc.ca/home/government-policy/the-white-paper-1969.html. 
 89. JEAN CHRÉTIEN, MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT, STATEMENT OF THE 
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON INDIAN POLICY (1969), available at http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100010189/1100100010191. The term “white paper” generally refers to an official report 
which illuminates government policy on an issue. Library of Parliament, White Papers, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA 
(last updated Dec. 6, 2009), http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/pages/WhitePapers.aspx. 
 90. CHRÉTIEN, supra note 89, at 3. 
 91. See Indian Chiefs of Alberta, Citizen Plus, 1 ABORIGINAL POL’Y STUD. 188, 188 (2011), available at 
http://ejournals.library.uAlberta.ca/index.php/aps/article/view/11690/8926. 
 92. CHRÉTIEN, supra note 89, at 2, 4. 
 93. Id. at 6. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 7. 
 96. Id. These six principles are:  
(1) that the legislative and constitutional bases of discrimination be removed; (2) that there be positive recognition 
by everyone of the unique contribution of Indian culture to Canadian life; (3) that services come through the 
same channels and from the same government agencies for all Canadians; (4) that those who are furthest behind 
be helped most; and (5) that lawful obligations be recognized; (6) that control of Indian lands be transferred to 
the Indian people. Id. 
 97. Id. at 7–8; These four steps are:  
(1) Propose to Parliament that the Indian Act be repealed and take such legislative steps as may be necessary to 
enable Indians to control Indian lands and to acquire title to them; (2) Propose to the governments of the provinces 
that they take over the same responsibility for Indians that they have for other citizens in their provinces. The 
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The sixth principle set out in the White Paper was “that control of Indian lands be 
transferred to the Indian people.”98 The concrete steps the White Paper proposed as a way 
to bring this principle to fruition were that Parliament should repeal the Indian Act and 
“take such legislative steps as may be necessary to enable Indians to control Indian lands 
and to acquire title to them.”99 The drafter of the White Paper saw the trust system as the 
chief evil affecting reserve lands.100 The “delays . . . frustrations and . . . obstructions” that 
mired an individual initiative would continue as long as the government of Canada had 
final say over the management and alienation of Indian lands and as long as each decision 
required ministerial approval.101 
Even though the express purposes of the White Paper, such as creating an “environ-
ment of legal, social and economic equality,” were laudable, the White Paper drew harsh 
criticism from the First Nations community.102 One especially critical refutation was “Cit-
izens Plus,” a direct response to the White Paper by a group known as the Indian Chiefs 
of Alberta (“Chiefs”).103 Though the paper took rhetorical aim at nearly all aspects of the 
White Paper, the criticism of the plan to increase Indian control over reserve land was 
especially harsh.104 In the opening paragraph of the preamble, the Chiefs voiced a premo-
nition that if the government followed through with its plan to increase Indian control over 
reserve land, it would not be long before “our people would be left with no land” and “the 
future generation would be condemned to the despair and ugly spectre of urban poverty in 
ghettos.”105 
The two stated reasons for the Chiefs’ opposition to proposition six were the poten-
tial loss of the land and the introduction of taxation; yet, their opposition, on the whole, 
seemed compelled by a reflexive mistrust of completely private control of resources.106 
The Chiefs advocated viewing reserve lands as strictly tribal land and not as Indian land, 
for the Crown did not reserve the land for individual Indians and the Chiefs were “opposed 
to any system of allotment that would give individuals ownership with rights to sell.”107 
The purpose of the land was exclusively for the “common use and benefit of the tribe.”108 
The trust system—which gave First Nations tribes the rights to use and benefit from 
                                                                            
take-over would be accompanied by the transfer to the provinces of federal funds normally provided for Indian 
programs, augmented as may be necessary; (3) Make substantial funds available for Indian economic develop-
ment as an interim measure; and (4) Wind up that part of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel-
opment which deals with Indian Affairs. The residual responsibilities of the Federal Government for programs 
in the field of Indian affairs would be transferred to other appropriate federal departments. Id. 
 98. Id. at 7. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 21–22. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 2; see also HAROLD CARDINAL, THE UNJUST SOCIETY (1999).  
 103. Indian Chiefs of Alberta, supra note 91, at 188. “Citizens Plus” was popularly referred to as the “Red 
Paper”—a playoff of the government policy report’s designation as the “White Paper.” Univ. B.C., supra note 
88. 
 104. Indian Chiefs of Alberta, supra note 91, at 189. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 189–90; see also id. at 197 (“The second error that the Government commits is making the assump-
tion that Indians can have control of the land only if they take ownership in the way that ordinary property is 
owned.”). 
 107. Id. at 198. 
 108. Id.  
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the land but allowed the Crown to hold ultimate title to it—was an important tool of en-
forcement in preventing alienation of tribal land regardless of the wishes of the person 
living on or using the land.109 The perceived problems that existed with the trust system 
were small compared to the prospect that the new Indian owners would rush to alienate 
their land and “within a generation or shortly after the proposed Indian Lands Act expire[d] 
[First Nations] would be left with no land.”110 The Indian chiefs of Alberta willingly de-
clared, “We have no king but Caesar”111 as they stated “[Indian lands] must be held forever 
in trust of the Crown.”112 
C. First Nations Land Management Act 
Still dissatisfied with the detrimental effect of the land management scheme con-
tained in the Indian Act, a group of chiefs proposed a new system under which First Na-
tions would draft, implement, and enforce their own land management codes.113 Thirteen 
tribes signed onto the Framework Agreement on First Nations Land Management 
(“Framework Agreement”), which laid out the terms of the agreement through which tribes 
could escape the land management portion of the Indian Act.114 Four years later, in 1999, 
the legislature enacted the Framework Agreement through the First Nations Land Man-
agement Act (“FNLMA”) with fourteen tribes enrolled as original signatories.115 
To opt into the FNLMA, a First Nations band would draft a land code which com-
plied with certain elements laid out in the FNLMA.116 Next, the individual tribe and the 
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development would have entered into an “indi-
vidual agreement” addressing the “transfer of administration” from the government to the 
tribe.117 Finally, a majority of tribe members living on and off reserve who participate in 
a vote on the measures must approve them.118 Once enacted, these land codes give to First 
Nations tribes the right to “exercise the powers, rights and privileges of an owner in rela-
tion to [First Nations] land.”119 The powers granted to the tribe include the power to grant 
licenses for the use of the land, the power to control the natural resources present on the 
land, and the power to “receive and use all moneys” acquired under the land code.120 While 
                                                                            
 109. Id. at 197–98. 
 110. Id. at 189. 
 111. John 19:15 (“Pilate saith unto them, Shall I crucify your King? The chief priests answered, We have no 
king but Caesar.”). 
 112. Indian Chiefs of Alberta, supra note 91, at 198 (emphasis added). The full quote reads: “It must be held 
forever in trust of the Crown because, as we say, ‘The true owners of the land are not yet born.’”  Id. 
 113. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 108 (explaining that this group was led by Chief Robert Louie of the 
West-bank First Nation, Chief Austin Bear of the Muskoday First Nation, and Chief Strater Crowfoot of the 
Siksika First Nation.).  
 114. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON FIRST NATIONS LAND MANAGEMENT (1996), available at 
http://www.labrc.com/FA.html; Framework Agreement on First Nations Land Management, FIRST NATIONS 
LAND MANAGEMENT RESOURCE CENTRE INC., http://www.labrc.com/FA.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2013). 
 115. First Nations Land Management Act S.C. 1999, c. 24 (1999) (last amended Dec. 14, 2012), available at 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-11.8; FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 108-09; FIRST NATIONS LAND 
MANAGEMENT RESOURCE CENTRE INC., supra note 114. 
 116. S.C. 1999, c. 24, supra note 115, at s. 6(1). These elements include such things as general rules for the 
“use and occupancy of First Nation land” and a specific forum for dispute resolution. Id. at s. 6(1)(b) & (i).  
 117. Id. at s. 6(3)(a). 
 118. Id. at s. 10(1)–(2); Id. at s. 12(1)–(2); Id. at s. 10(2). 
 119. Id. at s. 18(1)(a).  
 120. Id. at s. 18(1)(b)–(d).  
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it grants to First Nations important land control powers, the FNLMA does not affect the 
underlying title to the land and does not allow tribe members to sell, exchange, convey, or 
transfer land outside of the band.121 
The signature element of the FNLMA incorporates the voluntary nature of the pro-
cess.122 From the Royal Proclamation of 1763 onward, a federal sovereign meted out laws 
and regulations to otherwise unwilling First Nations.123 The FNLMA turned this trend on 
its head by including in the legislation only tribes with the voluntary consent of the tribe 
members and by creating a system through which the tribes themselves created and con-
trolled the new land management system.124 As of early 2013, thirty-five of the over six 
hundred First Nations communities in Canada operated under their own land codes, and 
thirty First Nations were in the process of implementing their own land codes.125 Sixty 
additional First Nations have expressed interest in opting into the FNLMA.126 Several First 
Nations that have implemented their own land codes have already experienced significant 
benefits after emerging from under the land control portions of the Indian Act.127 
One such success story is that of the Mississaugas of Scugog Island.128 Though they 
are a small band, the land code they created, which went into effect in 2000, is a model for 
First Nations land code development.129 The defining feature of the land code is the for-
malization of customary land rights through a registry requirement.130 These interests, 
once registered, entitle the holder to the “exclusive use and occupancy” of the land at issue 
and, perhaps most significantly, protect the holder from the expropriation of the land by 
the tribe.131 
The freedoms created under the FNLMA have had concrete economic benefits for 
the Mississaugas and have laid the groundwork for future economic development.132 
Transaction costs have significantly decreased because the time it takes to complete a land 
transaction has decreased from up to two years under the Indian Act to, in some cases, a 
                                                                            
 121. Id. at s. 26(1); FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON FIRST NATIONS LAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 113, at s. 
13.3. 
 122. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 148; see also id. at 21.  
 123. Id. at 58 (“Above all, [the Royal Proclamation of 1763] was a unilateral document, issued by King George 
III after being drawn up by his advisors. There was no attempt at negotiation or even consultation with the natives 
of North America regarding the property rights which the Proclamation attributed to them.”); see also id. at 45.  
 124. S.C. 1999, c. 24, supra note 115, at s. 12(2); Id. at s. 6(1); see MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND 
NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT, EXPERIENCES IN FIRST NATIONS, INUIT AND NORTHERN COMMUNITIES 
COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY PLANNING 96 (2004), available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collec-
tion/R2-262-2003E.pdf [hereinafter MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS] (“One of the first things we did was for our 
Chief to consult our Elders. Together, they considered ‘What does land management involve and what will it 
mean for our First Nation?”) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
 125. First Nations Land Management Act, ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CANADA 
(June 19, 2013), http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1317228777116/1317228814521 [hereinafter ABORIGINAL 
AFFAIRS]; First Nations People of Canada, ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CANADA 
(Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1303134042666/1303134337338. 
 126. ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS, supra note 125.  
 127. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 110–17.   
 128. MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 124, at 90–94. 
 129. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 110. 
 130. Scugog Island First Nation Land Management Code, supra note 35, at s. 15.1. 
 131. Id. at s. 16.3, 29.1. The land code also formalizes the procedure for dispute resolution and removes the 
federal government from the process of land transactions in favor of local tribal control. Id. at s. 26; FLANAGAN, 
supra note 11, at 111–12. 
 132. MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 124, at 92, 94.  
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matter of hours under the control of the tribe.133 Because the Mississaugas administer their 
own land code, creditors view them as a more “stable potential partner,” which has opened 
up capital for business development.134 The capital the Mississaugas have secured has en-
abled them to create the Great Blue Heron Charitable Casino, which has not only secured 
full employment for the tribe but also employs around 900 workers from the surrounding 
areas and other First Nations.135 
Yet these economic benefits are secondary to the Mississaugas’ final goals—tribal 
sustainability and self-government.136 While controlling the destiny of their land through 
local governance is merely the first step towards complete self-government, local land 
management serves as a valuable example of the ability of small tribal units to govern 
themselves effectively without federal interference.137 Due to local business development 
and the promise of future development stemming from the ability of the tribe to secure 
capital, the community can now incentivize young people to stay and members who had 
left the community to return.138 
Despite the benefits and opportunities the FNLMA has created for First Nations, 
several serious problems remain that demonstrate the need for continued reform in the 
areas of land management and land rights.139 The most pressing problem affecting the 
success of tribal land management under the FNLMA is the expected proliferation of di-
vergent land codes.140 Though the decrease in transaction costs has made development on 
reserve land more attractive to businesses, the varied nature of the rights and procedures 
laid out in the land codes themselves cause undue confusion and complication for any 
company seeking to do business with more than one tribe.141  The absence of a model land 
code has exacerbated this problem.142 Also, a general lack of resources has increased the 
cost of developing land codes and training staff members, as well as generally increasing 
the amount of time needed to complete the process.143 
IV. THE HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AMONGST THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE  
OF THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indians 
In 1883, a group of prestigious religious, legal, military, and political leaders began 
gathering on the grounds of the Lake Mohonk Mountain House in New York to discuss 
the plight of Indians in the United States and decide upon a single course of action to 
                                                                            
 133. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 113. 
 134. MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 124, at 92. 
 135. Id. 
 136. MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 124, at 94. 
 137. FLANAGAN, supra note 11, at 111; MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 124, at 94. 
 138. MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 124, at 92, 94. 
 139. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 118–19. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. (“Taken to the extreme, this could lead to 630 different First Nation land codes in Canada, each with 
uniquely defined property rights . . . .”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 109, 118-19. The average time needed in order to complete the process of implementing a land code 
under the FNLMA is 1,068 days. Id. at 109.  
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relieve their suffering.144 Attendants included former Supreme Court Justice William 
Strong, author of the majority opinion in Strauder v. West Virginia prohibiting the exclu-
sion of blacks from juries;145 General Clinton B. Fisk, founder of the “Fisk University for 
the education of colored youth;”146 and James E. Rhoades, president of the first college to 
grant doctoral degrees to women.147 This committee—the Lake Mohonk Conference of 
Friends of the Indians (“Conference”)—had a monumental effect on the future of tribes in 
the United States through its intellectual progeny—the General Allotment Act of 1887 or, 
as it is commonly known, the Dawes Act (“Act”).148 
Albert K. Smiley—a member of the board of Indian Commissioners and one of the 
founders of the Conference—enunciated the primary goal of the Conference.149 Unwit-
tingly echoing the sentiments of the citizens of Babel who cried “[g]o to, let us build us a 
city and a tower,” Mr. Smiley stated, “[m]y aim has been to unite the best minds interested 
in Indian affairs, so that all should act together and be in harmony, and so that the promi-
nent persons connected with Indian affairs should act as one body and create a public 
sentiment in favor of the Indians.”150 For three days the members of the Conference, acting 
as a primitive think tank, met to air their grievances about the present state of Indian affairs, 
propose policy changes, and discuss their experiences as they attempted to rally political 
support for those proposed policies.151 Although over 130 years have passed since the first 
Conference convened, a review of the proceedings revealed that members of the Confer-
ence were concerned by many of the same indignities and wrongs cited by modern Native 
American (and First Nations) advocates.152 
During the Conference of 1885, C.C. Painter, a pastor and professor of theology at 
Fisk University, deftly explained the institutional barriers to progress.153 Painter stated un-
equivocally that “the difficulties do not lie with [the Indians], but in Washington.”154 The 
Federal government had broken the treaties it had created with the tribes.155 It had not 
respected the rule of law in its dealings with Indians.156 The interests of white men with 
money or connections in Washington had continuously and effectively frustrated any at-
tempt at legislative reform.157 
                                                                            
 144. LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE OF FRIENDS OF THE INDIANS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL 
MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE OF FRIENDS OF THE INDIANS (1885) [hereinafter LAKE 
MOHONK]; FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 43.  
 145. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 5. 
 146. LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 1; Obituary Clinton Bowen Fisk, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1890, available 
at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=940DEEDE133BE533A25753C1A9619C94619ED7CF. 
 147. LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 5; James E. Rhoads, first president of Bryn Mawr College (1884-
1894), BRYN MAWR COLLEGE, http://www.brynmawr.edu/Library/exhibits/inauguration/rhoads.html.  
 148. Dawes Act, supra note 63; see LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 1, 27–28.  
 149. LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 1. 
 150. Genesis 11:3-4 (“And they said one to another, Go to, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly. And 
they had brick for stone, and slime had they for morter.  And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, 
whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the 
whole earth.”); LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 1. 
 151. LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 1; see also id. at 5–6, 11-14, 27–28.  
 152. These issues range from treaty rights and land rights to alcoholism and welfare. See id. at 14–16, 29–32. 
 153. Id. at 11–14. 
 154. Id. at 11. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 12. 
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If, perchance, a Congressman were to take an interest in a bill promoting reform, it 
would be next to impossible to get the bill passed—or even voted on—owing to the pro-
cedural rules then in place.158 Even if the direct emissary of the federal government to the 
Indian tribes—the Indian Agent—were an honest man who sincerely wanted good for the 
Indians under his charge, he would have “[found] himself tied hand and foot” by regula-
tions and politics.159 Painter observed that the situation was such that “if [the Indian Agent] 
succeeds, it will be by a wonderful Providence.”160 In Painter’s view, the prevailing federal 
policy left members of the Indian tribes with “no opportunity as a man, and no protection 
as a citizen.”161 
Painter, in his exposition, decried the inefficiency, abuse, and error that were the 
results of the federal government’s continued refusal to apply the Whig principles of local 
government, rule of law, and private property rights to its dealings with the tribes.162 Yet, 
the direct application of those principles did not meet with universal approval amongst the 
members of the Conference.163 Mr. Smiley’s response—that the current system was not 
optimal but it was the only viable option—was based on a series of assumptions grounded 
in the Tory ideal of justice and stability through strong central leadership.164 As Dr. 
Rhoades explained, while the Conference would address “positive mistake[s]” made by 
the federal government, it was the intent of the Conference to “do all in its power to 
strengthen the hands of the President, the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, and other officers engaged in Indian management” and “pass by what may 
sometimes seem to us unwise, and give them our hearty support.”165 
B.  The Dawes Act 
While the Conference failed to effectively address concerns about federal ineffi-
ciency and the absence of the rule of law in dealings with Indian tribes, the Conference 
generated one proposal for the redistribution of reserve land based on an increase in cen-
tralized government involvement in tribal affairs that permanently changed the course of 
Indian affairs.166 Following the Conference of 1884, three members of the Conference took 
part in a committee that met with President Cleveland and discussed the future of federal 
Indian policy and administration, including “the importance of defending the rights of the 
Indians to their lands.”167 According to the Conference, to achieve this objective the Indi-
ans must first “hold their lands in severalty.”168 There must then be a twenty-five year 
buffer period during which time the tribe member could not alienate or encumber the 
                                                                            
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 11–12. 
 160. Id. at 11. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 11–14. see FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 30.  
 163. LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 16, 29, 36. 
 164. Id. at 16. Mr. Smiley asserted that appropriations and regulations needed to flow from Washington to the 
tribes. In order to achieve some semblance of efficiency in the process, the federal government needed to imple-
ment a large, if somewhat ponderous, structure of “regulations and rules, and a complicated system of bookkeep-
ing” in order to manage those appropriations and regulations. Id. 
 165. Id. at 27. 
 166. Id. at 6. 
 167. Id. at 5–6. 
 168. Id. at 6. 
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land.169 After each Indian claimed his own plot of land, “the rest of the reservations should 
be thrown open to public occupation,” and the United States could buy the land and then 
use the money for the benefit of the Indians.170 
These proposals made by the Conference to President Cleveland formed the basis of 
the General Allotment Act of 1887—a bill sponsored by Senator Henry L. Dawes who 
was a speaker at the 1885 Conference.171 The government gave the individual tribe mem-
bers designated as heads of their households one tract—one hundred sixty acres—of re-
serve land.172 The federal government held these tracts “in trust for the sole use and benefit 
of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made” or to his heirs for twenty-five 
years.173 If the individual attempted to convey or encumber the land before the end of the 
trust period, “such [a] conveyance or contract [would] be absolutely null and void.”174 
Under the original language of the Act, after the government granted all members of 
the tribes a tract of land, or “sooner if in the opinion of the President it shall be for the best 
interests of said tribe,” the Secretary of the Interior would negotiate with the tribes for the 
sale of all land not allotted to tribe members.175 The government would then hold the pro-
ceeds of the sale in trust for the “sole use of the tribe or tribes Indians.”176 The Conference 
advocated using the proceeds of the sale for the benefit of the tribes; however, they did not 
envision the beneficiaries directly controlling the expenditures presumably made for their 
benefit.177 Instead, proceeds were “at all times subject to appropriation by Congress for 
the education and civilization of such tribe or tribes of Indians or the members thereof.”178 
The defining feature of the Act was the mandatory participation requirement.179 The 
Business Committee of the Conference of 1885 resolved that before implementation of the 
new land policy, the government should undertake “[e]very reasonable effort to get the 
consent of the Indian, but if the consent of a tribe cannot be obtained,” the government 
should execute the new land policy without their consent.180 Members of the conference 
were “utterly opposed to any arrangement which would allow the Indians to huddle to-
gether, if they want to . . . holding their lands forever to the exclusion of civilizing influ-
ences.”181 The Act not only adopted this attitude but went beyond it by declaring that it 
was the President’s prerogative to unilaterally survey and allot reserve land.182 Not only 
was no express consent on the part of the Indian tribes needed for allotment, but “if any 
one entitled to an allotment shall fail to make a selection [w]ithin four years” an agent 
                                                                            
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 34–45.  
 172. Dawes Act, supra note 63; FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 44-45. The government also granted 
single persons and orphans under the age of eighteen years old a fraction of a tract of land. Dawes Act , 24 Stat. 
at 388. 
 173. Dawes Act, 24 Stat. at 388. 
 174. Id. at 389. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 390. 
 177. LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 6. 
 178. Dawes Act, 24 Stat. at 390. 
 179. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 45. 
 180. LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 28 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Dawes Act, 24 Stat. at 388. 
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“appointed for that purpose” would “make a selection for such Indian.”183 
Though devised by a committee of otherwise capable and arguably sympathetic so-
cial reformers, allotment—as implemented through the General Allotment Act of 1887 
and an amendment to the Act passed in 1891—proved to be a disaster for the Indian 
tribes.184 By 1933 the amount of land held by Indian tribes declined from over 136 million 
acres to less than 70 million.185 The imposition of a period of time during which owners 
could not alienate their land necessitated the subdivision of the land, created a multitude 
of heirs who each held only a nominal fractional share of the allotted land.186 The burden 
of reconciling all those shares prevented the effective utilization of the land, and the 
“checkerboard[]” of various types of land rights on reservations that faced potential devel-
opers also stunted future economic growth.187 
Even the original goal of the Conference in championing allocation—the civilization 
of the Indians—was not realized under the Act.188 The expected substantial increase in 
Indian farming on discrete familial homesteads, which the Conference saw as a crucial 
step towards turning Indians into civilized agrarians, did not materialize.189 By 1900, non-
Indians leased almost half of the allotted tracts.190 Increased compliance with the Act re-
versed the “substantial growth” of Indian farming that had sprung up based on customary 
land rights in the years before Congress passed the Act and in subsequent years before the 
government had widely allotted Indian land.191 Indians that had previously successfully 
farmed small lots to which they held customary title found it to their advantage not to 
increase their farming efforts, as was the intent of the Conference and the Act, but rather 
to lease the remaining land and derive an income as landlords since the government had 
granted them legal title to more land than they could use.192 The Act did not create a full 
realization of the goal of encouraging white settlement on the newly opened reserve land 
since the government retained nearly two-thirds of the surplus land.193 
                                                                            
 183. Id. 
 184. See generally id.; An Act to Amend and Further Extend the Benefits of the Act Approved February 
Eighth, Eighteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven, 26 Stat. 794 (1891), available at http://digital.library.ok-
state.edu/kappler/Vol1/ HTML_files/SES0056.html. See FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 42–49. 
 185. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 48–49. 
 186. Id. at 48. 
 187. Id. at 48–49. 
 188. LAKE MOHONK, supra note 144, at 48; see LEONARD A. CARLSON, INDIANS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE 
LAND: THE DAWES ACT AND THE DECLINE OF INDIAN FARMING 79-113 (1981). For example, after allocation 
Indians on the Santee and Sisseton reservations experienced “increased poverty and a sharp decline in the amount 
of farming done by Indians” as well as “a decrease in school attendance, an increase in drunkenness, and an 
overall decline in group cooperation.” CARLSON, supra, at 137. 
 189. CARLSON, supra note 188, at 133–62. 
 190. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 48. 
 191. Id. at 52. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 48–49. 
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V. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN FIRST NATIONS PROPERTY RIGHTS:  
THE FIRST NATIONS PROPERTY OWNERSHIP INITIATIVE 
A.  The Nisga’a Final Agreement 
For over one hundred years, the Nisga’a Nation fought for a treaty that would rec-
ognize and protect the rights they asserted to their lands.194 The Canadian parliament 
passed the Nisga’a Final Agreement (“NFA”) in 2000, and the terms of that agreement 
directly inspired the birth of the FNPO.195 Under the NFA, the Canadian government 
granted the Nisga’a Nation the right to control its land free from federal interference and 
the right to extensive self-government.196 In sharp contrast to previous attempts at reform, 
which focused mainly on changing the character of the law within the framework of the 
Indian Act, the NFA released the Nisga’a Nation from the Indian Act.197 Instead of merely 
granting the Nisga’a more control over its designated reserve land, the government no 
longer legally considered Nisga’a land to be reserve land and granted fee simple title to 
the Nisga’a Nation.198 The NFA also moved the reversionary rights in the land from the 
government to the band, except in limited situations.199 
From a historical perspective, the change in tone that accompanied the negotiation 
of the NFA was even more striking than the change in the land rights themselves.200 The 
government no longer adhered to the policy of strict paternalism and unilateral control 
imposed by a strong, central power which had previously defined governmental actions 
from the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to the laws which made it illegal for Indian bands to 
raise money to advance land claims during the first half of the twentieth century.201 Instead, 
all parties recognized that “reconciliation between the prior presence of Aboriginal peoples 
and the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown is best achieved through negotiation and 
agreement, rather than through litigation or conflict.”202 Breaking with their traditional 
support of governmental policies which treated aboriginal people as “minors” and sought 
to order their affairs for them, the Courts recognized that “[w]here adequately resourced 
and professionally represented parties have sought to order their own affairs . . . the Court 
should strive to respect their handiwork.”203 
Empowered by the AFN to create a unique land policy and independently direct 
tribal affairs, the Nisga’a Nation went beyond tribally held fee simple title and instituted 
                                                                            
 194. Fact Sheet: Nisga’a Treaty, ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CANADA (Sept. 15, 
2010), http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016428/1100100016429.  
 195. First Nations Tax Comm’n, An Interview with C.T. (Manny) Jules about FNPO, FIRST NATIONS 
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP INITIATIVE, http://fnpo.ca/Interview.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2014); Fact Sheet: 
Nisga’a Treaty, supra note 194. 
 196. Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, S.C. 2000, c. 7.  
 197. Chief Mountain v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2011 BCSC 1394 (Can.), para. 27. The Indian 
Act still applies to the Nisga’a in the area of determination of Indian status. Id. 
 198. Id.; Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, ch. 3, s. 3. 
 199. Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, ch. 3, s. 7. 
 200. Chief Mountain, 2011 BCSC 1394, para. 19–21. See supra Part III.A. 
 201. See supra Parts II.B & III.A; FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 155. 
 202. Chief Mountain, 2011 BCSC 1394, para. 21.  
 203. MILLER ET AL., supra note 70, at 60; Chief Mountain, 2011 BCSC 1394, para. 3 (quoting Beckman v. 
Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 (Can.)) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).  
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the Nisga’a Landholding Transition Act (“LTA”) in 2009.204 Under the LTA, the Nisga’a 
Nation became the only First Nation to give individual members the opportunity to hold 
their land in fee simple, use the land as security for a loan, and transfer it to whomever 
they chose regardless of whether the individual was or was not Nisga’a.205 In late 2013, 
the Nisga’a land office announced that it had signed off on the first three property transfers 
to tribe members.206 
B.  Basic Framework of the FNPO 
Like the Levellers imprisoned in Burford Chapel, the Nisga’a sought to “throw off 
the Norman yoke” and establish a land system based on the three pillars of the rule of law 
with an emphasis on strong personal property rights, local representative government, and 
personal autonomy.207 Following the path the Nisga’a pioneered during its historic pursuit 
of a treaty, the creators and supporters of the FNPO now seek to offer that same liberty to 
all First Nations.208 
If passed, the FNPO would create the possibility of complete, private control of First 
Nations land by First Nations.209 Instead of merely changing the contours of the possession 
rights that the Indian Act granted to First Nations, the FNPO would “recognize the First 
Nation[s] as holding fee simple title to [their] former reserve land.”210 First Nations would 
also exercise reversionary rights, expropriation rights, regulatory jurisdiction, and the 
power of taxation over their lands.211 These powers would continue even if the First Na-
tions chose to enact the second prong of the ownership plan—allowing band members to 
individually hold title to their land in fee simple and transfer it to non-members if they 
wish.212 
The FNPO envisions a land system that sheds the accoutrements of federal control 
and replaces them with local tribal control of tribal land.213 Under the FNPO, the Crown 
would transfer the underlying title to First Nations bands, and either the bands or individual 
                                                                            
 204. Nisga’a Landholding Transition Act (2009), available at http://www.nisgaalisims.ca/files/nlg/ 
Nisga’a%20Landholding%20Transition%20Act%20(October%202009).pdf. 
 205. Nisga’a Landholding Transition Act Passed, NISGA’A LISIMS GOVERNMENT, http://www.nisgaa-
nation.ca/news/nisgaa-landholding-transition-act-passed (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); B.C.’s Nisga’a Becomes 
Only First Nation to Privatize Land, CBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-colum-
bia/b-c-s-nisga-a-becomes-only-first-nation-to-privatize-land-1.2355794. See Andrew Findlay, The Nisga’a’s 
Private Struggle, BC BUS. (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.bcbusiness.ca/real-estate/the-nisgaas-private-struggle. 
 206. B.C.’s Nisga’a Becomes Only First Nation to Privatize Land, supra note 205. 
 207. Daniel Hannan, We Have Submitted Ourselves to a New Norman Yoke, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 30, 2009), 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/danielhannan/100018325/we-have-submitted-ourselves-to-a-new-norman-
yoke/. 
In 1649 . . . [a] number of Roundhead soldiers, who believed that they had been fighting 
to reverse the catastrophe of 1066 – to “throw off the Norman Yoke”, in their phrase – felt 
betrayed by the new settlement, and continued to demand an extension of the franchise. 
Cromwell had 300 of the radicals – who had become known as Levellers – interned in 
Burford church.  
Id. See also HANNAN, supra note 23, at 147–48. 
 208. Proposal, supra note 18.  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
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members could hold fee simple title to the land.214 The jurisdiction of local tribal govern-
ments would include areas similar to those exercised by the Nisga’a such as the “[u]se, 
management, planning, zoning, development and similar matters related to the regulation 
and administration” of tribal land.215 A Torrens style land registry system would also re-
place the “difficult to access and . . . incomplete” Indian Lands Registry, which “[d]evelop-
ers [currently] use . . . at their own risk.”216 
Most significantly, the voluntary nature of the process distinguishes the FNPO from 
other examples of top-down legislation such as the Indian Act or the Dawes Act which 
failed to respect the autonomy of the bands.217 Instead of automatically applying to all First 
Nations, the FNPO would grant First Nations the opportunity to opt into the legislation 
upon an “acceptable demonstration of community support.”218 Once a band opts into the 
FNPO, it would have the freedom to decide how it would apply the land title system.219 
While bands could allow all tribal land to be held by individuals in fee simple, they could 
also decide to exercise greater control over the land.220 The FNPO would also cultivate 
individual autonomy as the creators of the FNPO believe it will eventually “reduc[e] (or 
eliminate[e]) the involvement of the First Nation (and certainly of the federal government) 
in the details of private transactions.”221 
C.  Potential Effects of the FNPO 
1. Enhanced Access to Capital 
The FNPO would radically change the current land system by allowing First Nation 
bands or their members to hold full, fee simple title to Indian reserve lands.222 Under both 
the Indian Act and the FNLMA, the rights a band or an individual band member could 
claim to land were limited to lease hold interests.223 Under the FNPO, bands and individ-
uals could claim the same ownership rights over reserve lands that all Canadians can claim 
in regard to off reserve lands: full, fee simple ownership with the ability to lease, sell, or 
mortgage the land without the approval of the Canadian government.224 
Allowing individuals to hold land in fee simple will permit the investment of money 
                                                                            
 214. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 177; Proposal, supra note 18.  
 215. Nisga’a Lisims Government, About, Nisga’a Nation, http://www.nisgaanation.ca/about-2 (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2014). 
 216. An Interview with C.T. (Manny) Jules about FNPO, supra note 195; Proposal, supra note 18.  
 217. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 170. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. For example, bands could limit the areas where the new system would apply or “limit tenure to lease-
hold title.” Id. 
 221. Proposal, supra note 18.  
 222. First Nations Tax Comm’n, FAQs: Questions about the First Nations Property Ownership Initiative , 
FIRST NATIONS PROPERTY OWNERSHIP INITIATIVE, http://fnpo.ca/FAQs.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
 223. Id.  
 224. How Government Perpetuates Native American’s Cycle of Poverty, STOSSEL IN THE CLASSROOM (origi-
nal air date Nov. 29, 2010), http://stosselintheclassroom.org/videos/ how_government_perpetuates_native_amer-
icans_cycle_of_poverty; Proposal, supra note 18.  
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in homes and property without the fear of losing the investment.225 Under the current sys-
tem, “buying a home on Indian reserve is the worst investment in Canada.”226 In an inter-
view, Michael Lebourdais—Chief of the Whispering Pines Clinton Indian Band and for-
mer banker—recounted how he begged his sister who wanted to move nearer to their father 
not to buy a house on reserve land because without holding the underlying title her “house 
[was] going to be worth zero the day the mortgage [was] paid.”227 If home ownership on 
reserve land were increased both would have economic benefits and would further the goal 
of preserving bands as stable social units.228 
At present only one tribe, the Nisga’a, allows individual band members to hold land 
in fee simple.229 At the end of 2013, the first three land transfers from the band to individual 
band members were finalized.230 As a result, individual members saw an immediate in-
crease in the value of their homes.231 Bert Mercer—the economic development officer for 
the Nisga’a government—estimates that his home’s value increased by $30,000 because 
of the transfer.232 
More importantly for entrepreneurs, that value is now available for the individuals 
to borrow against since the owner can mortgage the property and the bank can seize the 
property in the event of a default.233 Members of the Nisga’a Nation who need capital to 
finance personal business ventures now have the option of using their own land as col-
lateral for a loan instead of asking for funds from a tribal government that can “often [be] 
painfully inert and cautious, extremely bureaucratic and not exactly a dynamo of entre-
preneurialism.”234 Similarly, the FNPO will allow individual entrepreneurs to privately 
finance the business ventures that will form the basis of a successful economy on Indian 
lands.235 
2. Reduced Transaction Costs 
According to Coase theorem: 
 
If all participants in the economy could be brought together, if initial 
ownership rights to all economically valuable entities were assigned 
among the participants, and if they could costlessly make fully specified 
and fully binding agreements, then the outcome should be an efficient 
economic plan, leaving only the division of spoils to be determined by 
                                                                            
 225. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 127–28. 
 226. Natives Fight for Property Rights and Prosperity, SUN NEWS (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.sunnewsnet-
work.ca/video/2995931896001. 
 227. Id. With such a steep penalty in place, many young professionals from First Nations have simply refused 
to buy homes on reserve land. Id. 
 228. MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 124, at 92, 94. 
 229. B.C.’s Nisga’a Becomes Only First Nation to Privatize Land, supra note 204. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id.; The Nisga’a’s Private Struggle, supra note 204.  
 234. The Nisga’a’s Private Struggle, supra note 204.  
 235. Richard Wright, The Nisga’a Experiment, PROP. & ENVTL. RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://perc.org/articles/nisgaa-experiment. 
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the bargaining strengths of the participants.236 
 
Unfortunately, one thing stands in the way of this economic utopia: transaction costs.237 
Transaction costs are the costs a party incurs pursuant to trying to gain information about 
a potential customer or supplier (search and information costs), negotiating and drawing 
up an agreement (bargaining and decision costs), and making sure the other party is abid-
ing by the terms of the agreement after it is made (policing and enforcement costs).238 
Today, because of the “imposed system of First Nations governance,” transaction 
costs are much higher on reserve than off reserve.239 A study by the First Nations Tax 
Commission found that “[i]t can cost four to six times as much to put together a major 
investment project on reserve.”240 The development time frame for a project on a reserva-
tion can be double, triple, or quadruple the time frame for the same project off reserva-
tion.241 That differential is driving commerce away from what might otherwise be optimal 
locations for business.242 
The most dramatic way in which the FNPO proposes to reduce transaction costs is 
through replacing the current deed system—the Indians Land Registry—with a Torrens-
style title system.243 Under a deed system, the registrar acts as a mere filing system for 
documents relating to a piece of property.244 The Indian Lands Registry is “poorly man-
aged,” “incomplete,” “difficult to access,” and “almost completely ineffective.”245 Since 
the parties and not the registrar bear the risk of an invalid title under a deed system, an 
incomplete and poorly managed registry adds a great deal of risk into any business trans-
action on reserve land.246 
In contrast to a deed system where “an abstract is evidence of title,” under a Torrens-
style land system “the Certificate of Title is the title.”247 The registrar is responsible for 
the validity of the title, and subsequent transactions only require the parties to examine the 
Certificate of Title to determine both current ownership and outstanding claims.248 This 
significantly reduces transaction costs in terms of both the money and time required to 
                                                                            
 236. AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS PERSPECTIVE 
37 (1998). 
 237. Id. at 37–38. Transaction costs are “costs other than the money price that are incurred in trading goods or 
services” such as “time, energy[,] and money.” Paul M. Johnson, Transaction Costs, A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY TERMS, http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/transaction_costs (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).  
 238. Thayer Watkins, The Transaction Cost Approach to the Theory of the Firm, SAN JOSE UNIV. ECON. 
DEP’T, http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/coase.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
 239. FIRST NATIONS TAX COMM’N, EXPANDING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY ON FIRST NATION LANDS, available 
at http://www.fiscalrealities.com/uploads/1/0/7/1/10716604/expanding_commercial_activity.pdf.  
 240. Id. at 1. 
 241. Id. at 2. 
 242. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 135–36. 
 243. An Interview with C.T. (Manny) Jules about FNPO, supra note 195. 
 244. Id.  
 245. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 164; An Interview with C.T. (Manny) Jules about FNPO, supra note 
195. 
 246. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 164; An Interview with C.T. (Manny) Jules about FNPO, supra note 
195. 
 247. Shaun Watchie Perry, Outline of the Torrens Act, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Aug. 2005), 
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/tor-
renact.html (emphasis omitted). 
 248. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 164; Perry, supra note 247.  
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facilitate the transfer of the title since “the amount of time [it takes] for a lawyer or other 
professional to review the current guaranteed title is minimal.”249 Having a guaranteed 
Certificate of Title also significantly reduces the risk to the buyer or investor who would 
otherwise be required, under a deed system, to establish title by piecing together docu-
ments housed in the incomplete Indian Lands Registry.250 The Nisga’a also recognizes the 
Torrens system as the “most culturally appropriate system” of land registration because it 
is the “public recording of interest”—similar in substance to the past practice of recogniz-
ing rights before a public gathering—”that establishes title.”251 
3. Greater Equality within a Culturally Responsive Framework 
Unlike Canada’s Indian Act or the Dawes Act in the United States, First Nations 
leaders created the FNPO to accomplish longstanding First Nations goals.252 In 1910, the 
Chiefs of the Shuswap, Okanagan and Couteau bands issued a statement, now known as 
the Shuswap Memorial, to the Canadian premier that recounted how their bands had re-
ceived the English settlers with “good faith, friendliness and patience.”253 In return, the 
Canadian government treated them as “subjects without any agreement to that effect and 
force[d] their laws on us without our consent, and irrespective of whether they [were] good 
for us or not.”254 Instead of living in harmony as trading partners or “guests” on Indian 
land, the Canadian government had appropriated the Indians’ lands and property and the 
bands declared that they had, in the end, found themselves “without any real home in this 
[their] own country.”255 
Critics of increased property rights amongst First Nations often claim that bands 
who seek to strengthen property rights are ‘embracing their own assimilation.’256 Yet the 
FNPO does not ask First Nations to adopt measures which would dilute their cultural iden-
tity such as abandoning their legal status as Indians, their cultural and societal ties, or their 
jurisdiction over tribal land.257 First Nations never unilaterally or uniformly rejected trade 
and property rights, but instead the Canadian government “legislated [First Nations] out 
of the economy.”258 The FNPO now offers Canada the opportunity to redress those past 
wrongs and offers bands the opportunity to settle the land question on their own terms.259 
The FNPO does not attempt to bring about what economist Thomas Sowell termed 
“cosmic justice,” which entails creating absolute equality of both prospects and out-
comes.260 Instead, the FNPO facilitates individual liberty in the area of land right through 
                                                                            
 249. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 164.  
 250. Id. at 163–64.  
 251. Id. at 164. 
 252. See Memorial to Sir Wilfred Laurier, 1910, WILLIAMS LAKE BAND, http://williamslakeband.ca/His-
tory/MemorialtoSirWilfredLaurier1910.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
 253. Id.  
 254. Id.  
 255. Id.  
 256. The Nisga’a’s Private Struggle, supra note 205. 
 257. Proposal, supra note 18.  
 258. How Government Perpetuates Native American’s Cycle of Poverty, supra note 224.   
 259. An Interview with C.T. (Manny) Jules about FNPO, supra note 195. Participation in the FNPO is com-
pletely voluntary, and those bands whose members do not feel that increased property rights are compatible with 
their tribal culture are free to continue under the current land management scheme. Proposal, supra note 18. 
 260. Thomas Sowell, The Quest for Cosmic Justice, THOMAS SOWELL, http://www.tsowell.com/spquestc.html 
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moving toward “the application of the same rules and standards to all.”261 In an article in 
support of the FNPO, Shane Gottfriedson—Chief of the Tk’emlups te Secwepemc and 
Chair of the Shuswap Nation Tribal Council—confronted the inequity of not extending 
land rights to include Indian land.262 He stated, “[i]n 2013 in Canada, only the mentally 
incompetent, children, and First Nation people on reserve are not allowed to own land. 
Property ownership is a basic human right.”263 
VI. MODERN PROPERTY RIGHTS AMONGST NATIVE AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES 
A. Modern Structure of Property Rights on American Indian Reservations 
In 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) formally ended the era of allot-
ment.264 When the dust settled, what the Dawes Act and other subsequent legislative and 
judicial actions created was a ‘checkerboard[]’ of various types of land rights.265 Four dis-
tinct categories of property emerged: “individual fee simple (private[] land owned by in-
dividuals), individual trust (held in federal trust for individuals), tribal trust (held in federal 
trust for the tribe), and fee simple tribal land (owned by the tribe, but not in federal 
trust).”266 
A title holder’s ability to leverage a piece of reserve land to gain access to capital is 
generally determined by whether the owner holds the land in individual fee simple or 
whether the government holds the land in trust.267 Federal regulations subject trust land to 
a variety of provisos that increase transaction costs and inefficiency.268 Various jurisdic-
tional and regulatory issues also decrease the value of the land, and the fractionalization 
of ownership amongst the heirs to the trust land continues.269 
Beyond merely reducing the landholder’s access to capital, the communal manage-
ment of land by both tribal governments and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) leads 
to the inefficient exploitation of natural resources on reserve land.270 The value of natural 
resources on reserve land in the United States is estimated at $1.5 trillion.271 Though there 
are vast coal, uranium, and oil and gas reserves on Indian land, parties cannot extract these 
resources without the oversight of various governmental agencies, including the BIA.272 
                                                                            
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
 261. Id.  
 262. Shane Gottfriedson, Escaping the Indian Act: Who Should Own the Land?, PROPERTY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 4, 2013), http://perc.org/articles/escaping-canadas-indian-act-who-
should-own-our-lands. 
 263. Id.  
 264. FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 50–51. 
 265. Id. at 49; Carlos L. Rodriguez et al., American Indian Collectivism, PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESEARCH CENTER (2006), http://perc.org/articles/american-indian-collectivism. 
 266. Rodriguez, supra note 265. 
 267. Koppisch, supra note 10. 
 268. Rodriguez, supra note 265. For instance, an owner of individual trust land cannot transfer the title, which 
prevents the owner from using the land as collateral. Instead, the collateral for a mortgage is the “income derived 
from the asset, rather than the asset itself.” Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Terry Anderson & Shawn Regan, Unlocking the Wealth of Indian Nations, PROP. & ENVTL RESEARCH 
CTR. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://perc.org/articles/unlocking-wealth-indian-nations.  
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
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This centralized control creates “layers of bureaucratic red tape” which add significant 
transaction costs to any attempt at development.273 Additionally, as with any large bureau-
cracy, the incentives of the agency lie in “budget maximization rather than efficient re-
source use.”274 The centrally planned economic growth measures often ignore the “milieu 
of political, cultural, ideological, and ownership constraints” of the tribes.275 Because of 
these and other factors, parties exploit resources on reserve at a rate lower than resources 
off reserve, and the benefit to the tribe is often a pittance.276 
Communally held reserve land, which forms the majority of reserve land, has fallen 
victim to the “tragedy of the commons.”277 The tragedy of the commons is traditionally 
explained by referencing the example of a public green where all parties are free to graze 
their herds.278 If the green is overgrazed it will be destroyed and will be worthless to all 
parties who currently use it.279 Unfortunately, none of the individual parties have any in-
centive to reduce their consumption of the resource because whatever one party preserves 
by reducing consumption now will not be available later, but it will merely be consumed 
by another party.280 “Therein is the tragedy,” wrote Garrett Hardin, “[e]ach man is locked 
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit[—]in a world that is 
limited. . . . Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”281 As Hardin recognized, the solu-
tion to this crisis is vigorous private property rights.282 
B. The Next Step for Native American Tribes? 
In 2012, Congress took a small step toward greater local tribal control of reserve 
land through passing the Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Homeowner-
ship (“HEARTH”) Act.283 The HEARTH Act gave tribal governments the authority to 
grant twenty-five-year business leases without federal approval.284 In passing the 
                                                                            
 273. Id. For example, the regulatory structure on the Fort Berthold reservation required a forty-nine-step ap-
proval process to drill on reserve land instead of the four-step approval process needed to drill in the same area 
but off reserve land. Unlocking the Wealth of Indian Nations, JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW (Oct. 10, 2013), available 
at http://perc.org/articles/unlocking-wealth-indian-nations-0.  
 274. Terry Anderson, The Property Rights Paradigm: An Introduction, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN 
ECONOMIES 1, 2 (Terry Anderson ed., 1992).  
 275. Id. 
 276. Anderson & Regan, supra note 270. For example, a study of private land and adjacent trust land used for 
agriculture showed the private land to be “30-90% more productive” in spite of there being little difference in 
the raw quality of the land. Instead, the author explains that it was “the amount of investment in the land that 
[was] different.” Koppisch, supra note 10. 
 277. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968). For a brief introduction 
to the principle of the tragedy of the commons see LearnLiberty, Tragedy of the Commons (uploaded 2011), 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MLirNeu-A8I. 
 278. Hardin, supra note 277, at 1244.  
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. The communal nature of much of the reserve land in the United States has also contributed to the 
substandard housing and lack of investment which has defined much of the reserve land in the United States. 
Koppisch, supra note 10. 
 282. Hardin, supra note 277, at 1245 (“The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private 
property, or something formally like it.”). 
 283. Jodi Gillette, Strengthening Tribal Communities Through the HEARTH Act, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 30, 
2012, 1:54 PM EDT), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/07/30/strengthening-tribal-communities-through-
hearth-act. 
 284. Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership Act, Pub. L. No. 112–151, § 2, 126 
Stat. 1150, 1151 (2012). 
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HEARTH Act, Congress and the Obama administration purported to recognize that tribes 
are capable of greater self-government and the subsequent reduction in transaction costs 
would be a net positive.285 
Though the Obama administration touted the passage of the HEARTH Act as a step 
forward on the road from poverty to prosperity, the HEARTH Act did not address the heart 
of the problem.286 As the First Nations who support the FNPO discovered, it is not practical 
for developers to invest in major projects based on short term leases.287 Even on a smaller 
scale, potential small business people cannot afford to invest the extra time, money, and 
energy needed to obtain a lease on trust land.288 An FNPO style approach to land hold-
ings—moving away from the trust system and granting individual tribe members ultimate 
title to their land—would remove these barriers to economic progress.289 As long as the 
holders of Indian lands are mere “ward[s]” of the federal government without strong prop-
erty rights or the ability to act autonomously, reserve lands will continue to operate as what 
economist Hernando de Soto termed “dead capital.”290 
If prosperity is going to take root amongst Native Americans currently living on 
reservation land, the tribes and individuals must decouple from the BIA.291 It is an incon-
venient fact that “any effort at land reform must go through the [BIA].”292 Unfortunately, 
the BIA is unlikely to voluntarily sign its own death certificate by devolving power, first, 
to local tribes and then to individual tribe members.293 When attempting to explain the 
reticence of bureaucrats to take common sense measures to remedy an over-expansive 
state, Member of the European Parliament Daniel Hannan has often quoted Upton Sinclair 
who said, “[i]t is remarkably difficult to make a man understand something when his salary 
depends upon his not understanding it.”294 In the end, the only tenable solution will be for 
tribes to decouple from the BIA.295 
Though the devolution of power from Washington to local tribal governments and 
the partial restoration of local sovereignty is a net positive, if legislation merely replaces 
the current trust relationship with the federal government with tribal control, Indian land 
will remain dead capital.296 A study by economist Terry Anderson revealed that while in-
                                                                            
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. An Interview with C.T. (Manny) Jules about FNPO, supra note 195. 
 288. Randy Simmons, Impressions, PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://perc.org/articles/impressions-4.  
 289. An Interview with C.T. (Manny) Jules about FNPO, supra note 195; Impressions, supra note 288.  
 290. Cherokee Nation v. State of Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831); DE SOTO, supra note 10, at 6. 
 291. Unlocking the Wealth of Indian Nations, supra note 270.  
 292. Koppisch, supra note 10. 
 293. Id. 
 294. DanielHannanMEP, Daniel Hannan on Cavuto: Europeanization of America (uploaded Feb. 17, 2012), 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kZHd-tA2pxs. During his tenure as a member of the European 
Parliament, Daniel Hannan witnessed a bureaucracy that took on a life of its own and like a cancerous tumor 
began funneling precious resources away from the body politic to assure its own growth and survival. See DANIEL 
HANNAN, THE NEW ROAD TO SERFDOM: A LETTER OF WARNING TO AMERICA (2011). 
 295. David Haddock, An Untrustworthy Trustee, PROP. & ENVTL. RESEARCH CTR. (2012), http://perc.org/ar-
ticles/untrustworthy-trustee. 
 296. Terry Anderson, At Last, Some Bright Spots in Indian Country, PROP. & ENVTL. RESEARCH CTR. (2012), 
http://perc.org/articles/last-some-bright-spots-indian-country. 
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dividual trust land was thirty-five percent less productive than similar land which was pri-
vately held, tribal lands were eighty-five percent less productive than privately owned re-
serve lands.297 Any entrepreneur seeking to start a business on tribal land is faced with the 
prospect of navigating a “quagmire” of regulations, assessments, leases, and commit-
tees.298 Instead, it is the development on pockets of private land that facilitates what eco-
nomic growth there is currently on reservations.299 If prosperity is going to emerge 
amongst the Native American population living on reserve land, there must be a move-
ment, like that seen amongst the Nisga’a and the First Nations proponents of the FNPO, 
towards either private ownership of reserve land or something which is its substantive 
equivalent.300 
VII. CONCLUSION 
At the end of Great Expectation, after the terrible repercussions of the seemingly 
benevolent actions of Pip’s unsolicited “benefactors” manifested, Pip dreamed: 
 
that I was a brick in the house-wall, and yet entreating to be released 
from the giddy place where the builders had set me; that I was a steel 
beam of a vast engine, clashing and whirling over a gulf, and yet that I 
implored in my own person to have the engine stopped, and my part in 
it hammered off.301 
 
So too are First Nations and Native American leaders seeing with clarity what many of 
their ancestors saw: that “[i]t is [the] government which is to blame by heaping injustice 
on us.”302 In spite of the risks cited by critics such as further loss of tribal land or tribal 
culture, First Nations leaders are demanding that their part in the federal bureaucracy be 
“hammered off” and they be cut free from the Indian Act and trust system.303 Native Amer-
ican entrepreneurs and advocates are also “entreating to be released” from the centrally 
planned society that purported to “civilize” them but in effect makes it “nearly impossible 
to do business on the reservation.”304 
Lack of workable property rights provides a convincing—if only partial—answer to 
the question, “Why are Indian reservation so poor?”305 Based on this, the next question 
most would ask is, “What is the solution?”306 Yet, if society can glean any wisdom from 
                                                                            
 297. At Last, Some Bright Spots in Indian Country, supra note 296.  
 298. Impressions, supra note 288.  
 299. Id. 
 300. Koppisch, supra note 10 (“Anderson puts the choice for tribes in sharp terms. ‘If you don’t want private 
ownership, and want to stay under trusteeship, then I say, “fine.” But you’re going to stay underdeveloped; you’re 
not going to get rich.’”). See supra Part V.  
 301. CHARLES DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS 462 (Charlotte Mitchell ed., Penguin Classics 1996) (1860-
61).  
 302. Memorial to Sir Wilfred Laurier, supra note 252. 
 303. DICKENS, supra note 301, at 462. 
 304. Id.; Alysa Landry, Native History: Dawes Act Signed Into Law to ‘Civilize’ Indians, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 8, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/02/08/native-his-
tory-dawes-act-signed-law-civilize-indians-153467; Children of the Plains, supra note 36.  
 305. Koppisch, supra note 10. 
 306. See generally id. 
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the experiences of Native Americans under such benevolent dictators as the creators of the 
Dawes Act, it is to beware lest society is tempted to adopt the seemingly affable and vi-
sionary policies of, in C.S. Lewis’ words, “omnipotent moral busybodies” who, in the end, 
“will torment [their wards] without end for they do so with the approval of their own con-
science.”307 Those who advocate legislative reform in the area of American Indian law 
should approach their task with the solemn understanding that, whatever the final course 
of action, “there are no solutions; there are only tradeoffs.”308 
Policymakers and advocates should adopt an approach that is “modest, and practical, 
and pragmatic, and not visionary.”309 Any policy decision should not focus on instituting 
a “grand plan” to remake the institutions that advocates perceive to be the source of the 
problem.310 Instead, proposals should focus on removing impediments to the realization of 
the three proven principles of personal autonomy, local representative government, and 
the rule of law.311 These principles must provide the foundation for all policy, and once 
the “structure[] [is] right then liberty and happiness will follow.”312 
Aboriginal leaders today must win the right to the one asset that the governments in 
North America have consistently denied them: “the freedom to choose.”313 In spite of a 
century of good intentions, Native American entrepreneurs still labor under a system in 
which they are “more regulated than a nuclear power plant.”314 Instead of subjecting the 
tribes to another century of social experiments, those responsible for formulating policies 
with regard to Indian affairs should seek only to nourish personal autonomy, local sover-
eignty, and the rule of law.315 
The FNPO should be enacted into law in Canada, and the United States should im-
plement similar legislation.316 The FNPO would cause a devolution in power from the 
federal government of Canada to individual bands and then to the individual band mem-
bers.317 It would reduce the transaction costs associated with developing reserve land and 
open up opportunities for First Nations entrepreneurs.318 A regime similar to the FNPO 
that transformed trust land on American reservation into the substantive equivalent of pri-
vate property would reduce economic inefficiency and release the entrepreneurial spirit of 
Native Americans.319 
                                                                            
 307. C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 13 AMCAP J. 147, 151 (1987). 
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The Apostle Paul explained, “as long as the heir is a child, he does not differ at all 
from a slave although he is owner of everything, but he is under guardians and managers 
until the date set by the father.”320 The “guardians and managers” have brought First Na-
tions and Native American tribes to the brink of complete desolation through generations 
upon generations of social engineering.321 It is time for the federal government to release 
them from their status as slaves and restore them to their positions as autonomous human 
being and the rightful owners of their land.322 
 
—Alexandria Mayfield* 
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